reconstruction following liberation. 2 This was characterised by prolonged, comprehensive and detail-oriented economic regulations. The scholarly basis for this narrative was first created by Odd Aukrust and Petter Jacob Bjerke's book Hva krigen kostet Norge (What the war cost Norway) published in the summer of 1945. This is the most politically influential book written by Norwegian economists in the twentieth century. Bjerve was then working in Statistics Norway, thus giving the book an official and authoritative status, helping it achieve its dominant status in the historiography. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the immediate as well as the more long-term economic consequences of the German occupation, concentrating on politics and policies affecting economic developments. We will emphasise the direct effects on the economy, including changes in its productive capacities as well as the structural changes and economic policy and administrative path dependencies originating during the occupation and in the immediate post war period.
One conclusion is that Aukrust and Bjerve's presentation of the bleak situation in 1945 was exaggerated and is, historically speaking, untenable. Another conclusion is that the German occupation initiated a twenty-year period in which the Norwegian economy was less open and exposed to internal and external competition than in any other period subsequent to Norway entering the liberal age of free trade and free international capital transactions with a convertible currency in the middle of the nineteenth century. Because the protectionist impact of the 1930s was smaller in Norway than in most European countries the influence of the occupation and the immediate reconstruction period which followed had both a more prolonged and a more profound impact on the scope of governmental economic regulations than is usually stated in historical research on the period's economic policy.
The paper is structured as follows after a historiographic note. We start with the immediate effects of the occupation, followed by Norway's special role in the German war economy.
Then we turn to aggregate and structural consequences of the occupation followed by a section on the regulation of prices, interest rates and currency transactions and a section on the new and prolonged regulation of agricultural markets as well as the new forms of wage and incomes policy.
A historiographic note
Research that focuses explicitly on the immediate, short and longer term economic consequences of the German occupation of Norway is limited. There is no comprehensive work on the economic aspects of the occupation from a Norwegian perspective. The most comprehensive studies, both of which concentrate on Norway's role in the German war economy, are the ones by Alan S. Milward and Robert Bohn. 5 Research explicitly focusing on the economic aspects of the occupation has been limited. This is reflected in the presentations of the topic in the text books on Norwegian economic history in the twentieth century. Until 2002 these textbooks, with a few minor exceptions, adhered closely to the presentations given by
Aukrust & Bjerve and Statistics Norway in 1945-46. 6 The only university economist dissenting from this presentation, Johan Vogt, seems to have been forgotten in subsequent research. 7 One explanation for this is that Vogt did not belong to the so-called Oslo-school of economics, the most prominent academics of which were Ragnar Frisch and Trygve Haavelmo. This school dominated economic thinking in Norway for decades after 1945. 8 No transparent recalculation of national accounts and GDP between 1939 and 1946 has been made since the preliminary calculations made during and just after the occupation. These calculations can largely be called educated guesses, especially regarding the years from 1942.
One of their main aims was to substantiate Norway's demand for large war reparations from Germany after liberation. 9 The assertion that German occupation resulted in a prolonged destruction of the Norwegian economy is difficult to square with the fact that the economy revived quickly in the post-war years. 12 In the more general presentations of Norwegian history, there is quite extensive emphasis on the economic and social aspects of the occupation. The main focus on the wide-ranging German building activities that did away with the prolonged unemployment from the inter-war period and food scarcity that brought about a clear tendency towards equalisation of income and living standards between the urban areas and the countryside. Food scarcity and the resultant black markets also contributed to increasing conflicts on the commodity market, to use Stein Rokkan's concept, manifesting itself several times after liberation. In the newer presentations there is a tendency to combine Hjeltnes' perspectives and at the same time repeat the essence of Aukrust and Bjerve's narrative, adding a few critical comments to the latter, but without explicitly rejecting their core message of an economy that had suffered long-lasting damage.
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The immediate effects of the occupation Norwegians were working on German building and construction projects. 
Norway's special role in the German war economy
Norway's position in Germanys' war financing system differed from that of other occupied countries in important ways. Norway experienced by far the largest direct occupation payments per capita. 24 This also seems to be the case if other contributions such as clearing arrangements are included. If we compare occupation payments with rough estimates of GDP the burden of occupation payments on the economy was fairly stable, probably around one third of GDP each year of the occupation. 25 This heavy financial burden reflected an occupation force that represented on average about ten per cent or more of the Norwegian population, which at the time was less than three million and enormous military related building activity. Following the British commando raids on the Norwegian coast in 1941 and as a result of Hitler's deep-seated concern that the Allied forces might invade Norway, the creation of Festung Norwegen moved to the centre of Hitler's strategic thinking. 26 This obliged Germany to bring more than 100,000 prisoners of war to the country in addition to other forms of slave labour as well as voluntary labour, increasing the workforce by up to 140,000 people. 27 All other occupied countries had a net export of voluntary and enforced labour to the Reich.
In addition, Norway was the only occupied country with surplus in the clearing accounts with the Reich. 28 There are two principal explanations to this. Germany continued to export coal and grains vital to the Norwegian economy, preventing hunger in the last year of the occupation. At this time, Norwegian exports to the Reich more or less collapsed. Moreover, large quantities of goods were sent to Norway outside the regular clearing system. These were not registered as imports, and were used in the Wehrmacht's or Nordag's building activities as well as in the Wehrmacht's operational activities based in Norway. 29 Thus Norway probably experienced a significant import surplus from Germany and German-controlled areas during the occupation. All other occupied countries had export surpluses, often very substantial ones, with the Reich in their clearing accounts.
Aggregate economic consequences of the occupation
The German military and civilian building and construction work, the bulk of which was financed by withdrawals from Norges Bank, was the driving force behind the booming economy in the first three years of the occupation, wiping out unemployment. Due to lack of raw materials and energy, economic activity slowed down increasingly from 1944 onwards, In a number of areas it is easy to document that the estimated capital losses were either unfounded or exaggerated. In addition to the reduction of stocks, one of the large loss items of the real capital accounts were personal chattels (shoes, clothes etc). These total losses were estimated to have been 1200 million NOK. However, with a few important exceptions, principally the people of Finnmark and northern Troms, there is no reason to believe that the lack of such belongings had any detrimental effect on the economic revival or the economic reconstruction more generally -to the contrary, in fact. In later versions of national accounting personal chattels were excluded from the (real) capital concept. 45 The Germans were also responsible for the introduction of the frozen fish industry on a large scale.
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Other structural economic consequences of the occupation
The occupation was characterised by economic modernisation, not least in terms of new infrastructure, as well as a tendency towards less efficient production methods and lower quality products. The latter was closely linked to the scarcity or absence of the usually used raw materials as well as imported finished products. This also led to the production of substitution products, often of low quality. 47 These so-called ashtray industries were characterised by small-scale production, often in new-established firms which were unable to compete when imports gradually revived in the late 1940s. In agriculture the shortage of food led to greater self-sufficiency or subsistence orientation at the household level. This even affected relatively large holdings, probably continuing to about 1950. 48 During the occupation, the goal of governmental regulation of agricultural production at the farm level was to increase the output of horticultural products at the expense of husbandry. Although farmers did not fully abide by these regulations, this change meant more labour-intensive production in summer time. At the same time the occupation and the higher wages paid by the Germans for work led to a decrease in agricultural employment until 1944. Then food shortages probably led to a small increase in the agricultural working force in the last part of the war. The overall effect of the occupation on sector employment was a significant increase in the secondary industries; however, this was temporarily halted from 1944. In contrast to the permanent unemployment of the inter war period, which had slowed down the transfer of labour from the primary industries, the booming economy from the summer of 1940 showed that workers were willing to move long distances to earn a higher income. 49 Thus after liberation the flight from the countryside commenced immediately, despite the lack of urban housing.
In those economic sectors where the Germans had been an important or dominant customer, the tendency to go-slow had become an internalised routine by the time of liberation. Lower work efficiency compared to before the war continued to be a problem in some sectors for many years after, such as in the state telegraph and telephone monopoly. 50 The combination of increasing incomes, depletion of stocks and few opportunities for large or long-term investment meant that sectors with high debt rates prior to the war, notably agricultural holdings, municipalities and fishermen, paid down their debts during the occupation. In addition, farmers and fishermen had significant surplus liquidity to invest in modern equipment and machines as soon as these became available in the reconstruction period. As soon as limited tractor imports started, farmers queued up to buy tractors, thus starting the rapid mechanisation of agriculture. 51 In manufacturing industries there was a significant modernisation effect linked to the large increase in electrical motors, enhancing production flexibility and efficiency. Other forms of innovation and incremental improvements have also been documented. After liberation, entrepreneurs relied on military-based technological developments such as sonar and radar when implementing innovations. 
Regulation of prices, rents, interest rates and currency transactions
In a number of important areas of economic governance new policies were created during the war or immediately after liberation. We will concentrate on new economic regulations and policies of a prolonged nature, thus creating new political and institutional path dependencies, starting during the war. We begin with the regulation of prices and dividends.
Immediately However, detailed price regulations on many consumer goods, particularly domesticallyproduced food products continued for decades.
Two other important elements of the price regulation system from the occupation period were also continued more or less unaltered after 1953. A maximum dividend that could be paid to owners of limited companies was introduced with effect from 1940. The dividend ceiling was originally five to eight per cent of the nominal share capital. 56 order to maintain price stability. 60 The other effect was that continued low interest rates could be achieved with moderate political intervention in the reconstruction period.
In January 1946 the Labour government nevertheless instructed Norges Bank to reduce the discount rate to 2.5 per cent, the lowest level ever at the time. This was the real beginning of the conscious low interest rate policy enjoying broad political backing in the post-war period.
In 1945 Bjerve and Aukrust had argued that long-term interest rates should be reduced to 2.5
per cent by political and administrative means. Low interest rates would ease a swift reconstruction, keep rents and housing costs down, increase investment and make it easier to achieve full employment, a prime political goal after liberation. Although under formal state supervision, it was not a body that could be controlled by the Quisling regime or the Reichskommissariat. The dairy monopoly and Riksoppgjøret were not dismantled but strengthened after liberation. This was because they were essential in maintaining consumer prices on dairy products uniform across the nation. They also played a key role in ensuring that increased milk prices for farmers were distributed fairly evenly geographically, regardless of farmers' location vis-á-vis urban centres. The monopoly of dairy co-operatives lasted without major changes until 1995, thus being one of the most important and long-lasting new regulations introduced during the occupation. Considering the status of the regulatory regime for milk producers and dairies, which were on the verge of collapsing prior to the German invasion due to the costly surplus production of milk and butter in the 1930s, the occupation could be characterised as a blessing in disguise for the dairy cooperatives and their owners. The increased importance of the state
The policies discussed so far were mainly related to the regulating role of the state. The increased role of the state in the economy had other elements as well. The occupation led to significant tax increases, with effect into the post-war area. The increase of both direct and some indirect taxes, mainly the purchase tax, were dramatic. The purchase tax was increased from two to ten per cent by the Administrative Council in 1940. 69 The nominal company tax was almost doubled to 50 per cent of net taxable profits of firms, continuing to 1992. The moderate progressive taxation rates on personal income and wealth from the interwar period was drastically increased with lasting effect, particularly in relation to income. Thus from 1941 up to 90 per cent of taxable personal income could be paid in tax. However, in the postwar period the effective tax level gradually declined both for companies and individuals due to many new tax deductions. The capital gains tax could amount to 88 per cent. 70 Together with strict dividend regulations this created an effective locking in of capital in existing firms.
The national taxation administration grew significantly during the occupation, making tax assessment in the municipalities more equal, but the Reichskommissariat's plans to introduce other major changes in the Norwegian taxation system proved futile. Norway, together with Denmark, Sweden and Britain, belonged to a group of countries in which the economies were regulated in a manner more akin to wartime regulation than in the other OEEC-countries in the first five to six years after the war. In this period the four countries were governed by Labour parties all or most of the time. With two major exceptions, it seems that the war-emulating regulations in Norway and Denmark did not differ greatly until the beginning of the 1950s. The exceptions were food rationing and the fact that Denmark never initiated a long-term policy of low interest rate as seen in Norway and
Sweden after the war. 77 In Norwegian historiography the traditional explanation for Norway's prolonged detailed regulation of the economy has been the Labour government and its new forms of planning which were, in turn, linked to the national budgets from 1947 inspired by Keynesian economists. 78 The argument in this paper is not to dismiss such explanations but to emphasise the importance of the experiences and administrative and institutional path dependencies from the occupation years much more strongly than has been done in previous research. Both the system of rationing and other forms of detailed economic regulations had been introduced and administered by unnazified Norwegian institutions, notably the Administrative Council and permanent key institutions such as the Price Directorate. With a few exceptions the system of rationing as well as other forms of detail-oriented regulations had functioned fairly well during the occupation and held significant public legitimacy that could be utilised after liberation. 79 In this context Aukrust & Bjerve's presentation of the alleged extensive German exploitation and destruction of the Norwegian economy was particularly important because seemingly politically unbiased economists legitimised a long-lasting continuation of the regulations which emulated those which existed during the war.
In the beginning of 1946 the Labour government made pragmatic concessions to secure the legitimacy of the rationing system. Rationing of tobacco and liquor were the first to end after liberation. The reason was not that the government believed that these goods, largely provided through scarce foreign currency holdings, were particularly important to people during reconstruction, but that the regulation system as such would be undermined by the widespread black markets dealing in these products. The rationing of clothing and textiles continued until 1951 and for many foodstuffs until 1952. 80 The most prestigious symbol of the modern consumer society, private cars, were rationed until the autumn of 1960 in order to keep private consumption down and investment rates high. Larger business-related building activity was also in effect rationed until the beginning of the 1960s, because obtaining the necessary building materials without a building permit was impossible. These regulations of the building sector existed so as to secure that governmental investment priorities were implemented.
War experiences and the popular and political legitimacy of regulations emulating wartime conditions in peacetime were very different in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In these countries the popular legitimacy of both rationing and regulations had been completely destroyed during occupation. Black markets were rampant and even significant parts of production in manufacturing industries were outside governmental control during the occupation, as in the Netherlands. 81 The German occupation initiated a prolonged period of much more direct state regulations of the economy than previously. Norway is often characterised as a small, open economy.
Particularly in the years 1940 to 1960 the openness suffered fundamental limitations. These restrictions were initially the result of externally imposed barriers to trade during the occupation. The legitimization of their prolonged continuation after liberation was to a significant degree due to the alleged long term destruction of the productive capacity of the economy during the occupation advocated by Aukrust and Bjerve and Statistics Norway in 1945-46. Behind these state restrictions to trade and competition formal and informal cartels prospered, creating business mentalities that paid lip service to the gospel of market competition rather than acting according to it. 82 The long term economic effect of those mentalities may very well have been more destructive for the long growth of the Norwegian economy than the direct effects of the German occupation.
